The United Nations defended the ICC as a critical part of the international justice system after Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington would use diplomatic and economic pressure to weaken the Court “brick by brick.”
The Trump administration is launching a campaign to dismantle the International Criminal Court, escalating Washington’s confrontation with the institution responsible for prosecuting individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.
In an opinion piece published Monday by The Wall Street Journal, Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that the Court represents a direct threat to American sovereignty because the United States never ratified the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC.
“America never agreed to a world tribunal that can override our own courts and the Constitution,” Rubio wrote.
He said the administration would launch a diplomatic campaign centered on “sovereign states over globalism” and pressure US allies not to cooperate with the Court.
“Using all the tools at our government’s disposal, working beside every ally with whom we can make common cause, we will dismantle the ICC — brick by brick, if necessary,” Rubio concluded.
The United Nations responded by defending the Court’s role in international accountability.
Although the ICC is legally independent of the UN, it remains “a critical cog in the international justice system,” UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told reporters Monday.
“It is supported by a vast number of Member States, and it helps bring accountability for serious crimes,” he said.
Asked about Rubio’s description of international law as a “self-appointed priesthood,” Dujarric emphasized that the international legal system was created by governments, not imposed upon them.
“International law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were created by sovereign Member States,” he said. “They have brought protection, they have brought relief to millions of people, and they are, as the Secretary-General has often said, under threat and under attack.”
Rubio’s case rests on a genuine dispute over jurisdiction.
The United States is not one of the 125 parties to the Rome Statute. Neither are Israel, Russia or China. Washington maintains that the Court cannot legitimately prosecute citizens of countries that never accepted its authority.
Rubio pointed to the ICC’s investigation into alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan, including by US military and intelligence personnel, as evidence that "the Court intends to exercise power over Americans without the consent of the US government".
He also warned that the Court could eventually pursue US military personnel, Border Patrol agents, federal prosecutors or elected officials for actions taken in defense of the country.
But the ICC does not claim universal authority over every person in every country. Its jurisdiction is generally tied to crimes allegedly committed:
Afghanistan joined the Rome Statute in 2003. The Court therefore argued that it could investigate alleged crimes committed on Afghan territory even when the accused were nationals of a country outside the ICC.
That is similar to the principle under which a foreign national can be prosecuted under the domestic laws of the country where an alleged crime occurred.
The ICC is also not an appellate court capable of overturning rulings by the US Supreme Court or invalidating the Constitution. Under the principle of complementarity, it is intended to act only when national authorities are unwilling or genuinely unable to investigate and prosecute crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.
That safeguard does not eliminate the sovereignty dispute. It shifts the question: who decides whether a domestic investigation was genuine or sufficient? Under the Rome Statute, the ICC’s judges ultimately make that determination for cases brought before the Court.
The Afghanistan investigation also presents a less immediate threat than Rubio’s argument suggests. In 2021, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan announced that his office would prioritize alleged crimes committed by the Taliban and ISIS-K, effectively deprioritizing investigations involving US personnel and former Afghan government forces.
Monday’s announcement builds on measures Washington has already taken against the Court.
The Trump administration has imposed sanctions on ICC judges, Prosecutor Karim Khan and deputy prosecutors in connection with investigations involving US personnel in Afghanistan and the Court’s Gaza cases.
In November 2024, ICC judges issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Israel rejects the accusations and disputes the Court’s jurisdiction.
The sanctions can freeze assets under US jurisdiction and restrict access to the American financial system. Their effects can extend well beyond the United States because banks, technology companies and other service providers may avoid dealings with sanctioned individuals or institutions.
Washington cannot formally abolish the ICC. The Court was created through a treaty among sovereign states, and only those states can amend or dissolve it.
It can, however, make the institution substantially harder to operate.
The ICC has no police force and depends on governments to arrest suspects, protect witnesses, collect evidence and enforce judicial orders. A successful US campaign could encourage governments to withdraw from the Court, refuse cooperation or avoid enforcing politically sensitive warrants.
That would leave the Court legally intact but operationally weaker.
Washington cannot abolish the ICC on its own. But it may be able to weaken the cooperation, financial access and political support the Court needs to function. What this campaign means for international justice — and why the sovereignty argument is more complicated than Rubio presents — is examined in today’s ONEST Take.
Rubio’s announcement is about more than protecting Americans from a court the United States never joined. It is an attempt to redefine the relationship between power, sovereignty and international accountability.
The strongest part of Washington’s argument is straightforward: the ICC’s authority is treaty-based, and the United States did not ratify that treaty. Allowing an external court to decide whether the US justice system has adequately investigated American personnel raises a legitimate sovereignty question.
But Rubio goes further. He presents international law itself as an elite foreign project imposed on sovereign nations. That ignores how the system was created. The Rome Statute was negotiated and adopted by governments. Its judges are elected by its member states. Countries join voluntarily, and national courts retain primary responsibility for prosecutions.
The Court does not override US courts in the way Rubio suggests. Its more controversial claim is that territorial jurisdiction can extend to citizens of non-member countries when they enter the territory of a state that has accepted the Rome Statute. Washington rejects that rule internationally even though territorial jurisdiction is a familiar principle in domestic criminal law.
There is also a deeper inconsistency in the US position.
Successive US administrations have rejected ICC jurisdiction over American personnel, but Washington has not treated the Court as illegitimate in every context. Under the Biden administration, the United States welcomed the ICC’s arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his alleged responsibility for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. The United States also abstained when the UN Security Council referred Darfur to the Court in 2005 and voted for the referral of Libya in 2011, although neither Sudan nor Libya was an ICC member.
The Trump administration is now going further than withholding US recognition or opposing cases involving Americans and allies. It is attempting to dismantle an institution established by 125 sovereign states — including US partners — and prevent them from supporting a court they voluntarily joined. That transforms the argument from a defense of American sovereignty into an effort to constrain how other sovereign states exercise theirs.
The ICC has serious weaknesses. It has been criticized for slow proceedings, uneven enforcement and a record that has disproportionately focused on African defendants. Yet the 2025 arrest and transfer of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte demonstrated that the Court can reach powerful figures when national authorities cooperate. Warrants against other leaders can remain unenforced for years. Without state cooperation, the Court’s legal authority often exceeds its practical reach.
But dismantling the institution does not resolve those weaknesses. It reinforces the central problem the ICC was created to address: accountability becomes strongest against weak states and weakest against governments with enough political, military or economic power to resist it.
The immediate test will not be whether Washington can make the ICC disappear. It cannot do that alone. The test will be whether US allies accept Rubio’s demand to choose between their obligations to the Court and their relationship with the United States.
If they do, the ICC may continue to exist in The Hague while losing the cooperation required to function. The result would not be the restoration of equal sovereignty. It would be an international justice system in which the reach of the law depends even more openly on the power of the accused.
