Why Territorial Concessions Are a Constitutional Near-Impossibility for Ukraine

Since the territorial issue is the prime focus of the Trump–Zelenskyy meeting, with ideas being floated about a national referendum to accept partial territorial surrender, it is worth reviewing what such a process would actually require under Ukrainian law.

Public discussion often treats “a referendum” as if it were a single switch that could be flipped. In reality, Ukrainian constitutional law imposes multiple sequential barriers—some legal, some procedural, and some existential to the state itself. Here is a step-by-step outline of what would need to happen, and how likely each step is.

Step 1: Martial law would have to end

What the law requires

Ukraine is currently under martial law. Under Article 157 of the Constitution, constitutional amendments are prohibited:

• during martial law or a state of emergency, and

• if they undermine territorial integrity.

Because any legal pathway to territorial cession would require constitutional change, martial law must first be lifted.

This is not a technicality—it is a hard constitutional block.

Probability

Low to moderate (25–40%) in the short term.

Ending martial law requires:

• cessation or dramatic reduction of hostilities, and

• political confidence that national security will not be immediately jeopardized.

Even if negotiations progress, lifting martial law before a durable security settlement would be legally risky and politically explosive.

Step 2: A constitutional pathway must be created

Ukraine’s Constitution currently does not allow ceding territory.

Two theoretical paths exist.

Option A: Amend the existing Constitution

Legal requirements

1. Constitutional Court review

   • The Court must rule that the proposed amendment does not violate Articles 1, 2, or 157.

   • Article 2 enshrines Ukraine as unitary and indivisible.

     
     

2. Parliamentary supermajorities

   • First vote: 226 MPs

   • Second vote (next session): 300 MPs (two-thirds)

Legal reality

Most Ukrainian constitutional scholars argue that any amendment permitting territorial cession would fail constitutional review, because territorial integrity is considered a foundational principle that cannot be amended away.

Probability

Very low (10–15%) This path is legally fragile and likely to collapse at the Constitutional Court stage.

Option B: Adopt a new Constitution

Legal requirements

1. Draft an entirely new constitutional text

2. Approve it through a constitutional process

3. Ratify it via a nationwide referendum

This would effectively reset the legal foundations of the Ukrainian state.

Political reality

This is not just about borders—it would reopen:

• the structure of the state,

• separation of powers,

• language, identity, and sovereignty clauses.

Ukraine has done this once (1996), under radically different conditions.

Probability

Extremely low (5–10%) Legally cleaner than Option A, but politically seismic.

Step 3: A nationwide referendum on territorial change

What the law requires

Under Article 73, any change to Ukraine’s territory must be approved by an All-Ukrainian referendum.

Key points:

• Local or regional referendums are invalid

• The question must explicitly state the territorial change

• All eligible Ukrainian citizens vote, including displaced persons

Practical obstacles

• Millions of citizens displaced internally or abroad

• Occupied territories unable to participate

• Security, legitimacy, and turnout challenges

Even if legally organized, the referendum’s legitimacy would be intensely scrutinized domestically and internationally.

Probability

Moderate but uncertain (30–50%), conditional on all prior steps. This step is imaginable only if Ukraine’s leadership actively supports it—which is itself a major assumption.

Step 4: Parliamentary ratification of an international treaty

What the law requires

Only after:

• constitutional barriers are removed, and

• a referendum authorizes the change,

can the Verkhovna Rada ratify a treaty transferring territory to another state.

Without the earlier steps, such a treaty would be unconstitutional and void under Ukrainian law.

Probability

Moderate (40–60%), if all previous steps succeed. This is procedurally the easiest step—but entirely dependent on everything before it.

Step 5: Entry into force under international law

Once ratified:

• the treaty would enter into force,

• borders would change in international legal terms.

However, international recognition would still depend on:

• treaty legitimacy,

• absence of coercion,

• compliance with international law principles.

Critical Analysis: Why this pathway is so unlikely

1. The Constitution is designed to prevent this outcome

Ukraine’s constitutional architecture deliberately makes territorial surrender nearly impossible. This is not a loophole—it is a safeguard born of historical experience.

2. Referendums are not shortcuts

A referendum is not the starting point; it is one of the final steps. Treating it as a standalone solution misunderstands Ukrainian law.

3. Wartime consent is legally and morally contested

Even if martial law were lifted, any decision made under the shadow of recent invasion would face arguments of coercion—both domestically and internationally.

4. Political consent ≠ legal validity

Even overwhelming political pressure from allies or adversaries cannot override constitutional requirements without dismantling the legal order itself.

5. Implications for international law and precedent

Even if executed through formally legal Ukrainian procedures, a territorial settlement reached after prolonged military occupation would risk setting a dangerous international precedent. It would blur the post-1945 principle that territory cannot be acquired by force, replacing it with a de facto standard in which sustained military pressure followed by political exhaustion produces lawful border change. Such an outcome would weaken the credibility of the UN Charter’s prohibition on aggression and incentivize future revisionist states to pursue faits accomplis first and legal normalization later. In that sense, the damage would extend far beyond Ukraine, eroding the normative barrier that distinguishes negotiated peace from coerced legitimization of conquest.

Conclusion

While ideas of a national referendum on territorial compromise are increasingly discussed in diplomatic contexts, Ukraine’s legal system places enormous barriers in the way of such an outcome. Ending martial law, reconstructing constitutional authority, securing nationwide consent, and preserving state legitimacy would all have to align—an alignment that is legally possible in theory, but politically and institutionally improbable.

In short: Territorial surrender is not just a political decision for Ukraine—it is a constitutional near-impossibility.