Deep Dive: Merz in the Gulf—Germany’s Qatar–Saudi reset, what’s real, what’s theater, and why it matters
- Olga Nesterova
- 2 hours ago
- 4 min read
Why this trip happened now
Germany is trying to reduce “single points of failure” in its foreign relationships—energy, supply chains, and security—at a moment when Berlin sees higher risk in over-reliance on any one major power bloc. That includes a growing discomfort with Europe’s LNG dependence on the United States since Russia’s pipeline gas collapsed after 2022.
Merz’s Gulf tour (Saudi Arabia → Qatar → UAE) is part of a broader German strategy to diversify partners—politically and commercially—while admitting, more openly than before, that values alignment is not the same thing as strategic alignment.
What was actually “signed” vs what was “promised”
1) Saudi Arabia: Substance is mostly upstream and medium-term
Signed / formalized:
Green ammonia / hydrogen pathway MoU: German utility EnBW signed a memorandum with Saudi ACWA Power (with partners including VNG and Rostock Port referenced in company materials) to develop an import pathway for ammonia to support hydrogen projects in Germany. This is a real document, but it’s still a development framework—early stage, execution-dependent, and long-dated.
Reporting in German press also frames Rostock as a future hub: ammonia shipped from Saudi Arabia (Yanbu is referenced) would be converted back into hydrogen in Germany—again: conceptually significant, operationally far away (timelines discussed around 2030 in some coverage).
Promised / discussed:
Merz signaled greater openness to arms cooperation/exports, after years of political sensitivity since Khashoggi. That’s a policy posture shift, not a contract—and it faces domestic and coalition constraints plus export-control realities.
Reality check (Saudi track):
The Saudi “deliverable” is strategic direction (hydrogen + industrial decarbonization) more than immediate volume. It’s the architecture of a future energy relationship, not an instant fix.
2) Qatar: Immediate energy leverage + defense signaling
Promised (substance depends on follow-through):
Merz said Germany wants to increase LNG imports from Qatar beyond the current 2 million tons/year. That statement matters because it signals a desire to expand a relationship that already has a concrete baseline. But it’s still a political commitment until contracts, volumes, and terminals align.
He also pledged a less restrictive stance on arms exports to Gulf states and said Germany would work “more intensively” on arms cooperation with “reliable partners.” That’s a big rhetorical shift—but it’s not a signed procurement deal.
Diplomatic choreography: invitation for Qatar’s emir to visit Berlin in July—a classic “relationship upgrade” marker.
Existing underlying substance:
Qatar is already deeply embedded in German corporate equity (major stakes in flagship firms are repeatedly cited), which makes Germany–Qatar ties structural, not just transactional.
The “2 million tons/year” baseline aligns with earlier long-term supply arrangements tied to deliveries expected from 2026 (through the QatarEnergy/ConocoPhillips structure). Merz is essentially signaling: we want more than the baseline.
Reality check (Qatar track):
Qatar is the “now” energy partner. The gap is not goodwill—it’s whether additional volumes can be contracted competitively, delivered via available infrastructure, and defended politically inside Germany.
What’s optics, what’s substance
Substance
Hydrogen/ammonia corridor planning with Saudi partners is real policy-industrial scaffolding—even if execution is years away and vulnerable to cost curves, carbon accounting rules, and shipping/cracking economics.
Germany openly seeking more Qatari LNG is a practical move in a Europe that wants optionality—especially when U.S.–EU relations are more volatile and LNG is increasingly geopolitical.
Optics
“Arms cooperation” language is partly signaling: to Gulf partners (“Germany is back as a supplier”) and to voters (“security realism”). But it’s also constrained by legal processes, coalition politics, and reputational costs.
Human rights references appear, but most reporting suggests they’re handled “behind closed doors,” while the trip’s center of gravity is energy + defense + investment.
The bigger global shift this signals
1) Europe’s “energy map” is being redrawn—again
Germany is trying to avoid replacing one dependency (Russia pipeline gas) with another (U.S. LNG dominance). Even partial diversification—Qatar volumes now, Gulf-linked transition tech later—changes Europe’s bargaining posture.
2) The Gulf’s role is expanding beyond oil and into “strategic infrastructure”
Saudi’s hydrogen/ammonia push is not just climate branding; it’s a bid to be indispensable in the next system the way it was in the last one. Germany engaging early is a bet that Gulf capital + industrial scale will matter in Europe’s decarbonization supply chain.
3) A security dimension is quietly being normalized
When Germany talks arms exports alongside energy, it’s treating the Gulf less like a values-problem and more like a strategic theater—connected to Iran, maritime security, and spillover risk from regional escalation.
What to watch next (the “proof” indicators)
Contracts, not communiqués: Any announced incremental LNG deals with Qatar (volumes, pricing structure, delivery terms).
German export-control changes in practice: approvals that signal Merz’s “less restrictive” posture is operational, not rhetorical.
Hydrogen corridor milestones: FEED studies, port infrastructure commitments, ammonia cracking deployment decisions—anything that moves the Saudi MoU from concept to capex.
The July Berlin visit (if it happens): watch for a packaged announcement designed for domestic German optics (energy security + jobs + “strategic autonomy”).
This Deep Dive is also available in video format.
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