Belarus Takes Its “Balloon War” Narrative to the UN — But Lithuania and Ukraine’s Public Record Undercuts Key Claims
- Olga Nesterova
- 9 hours ago
- 4 min read
Belarus has submitted a formal annex to the United Nations arguing that Lithuania’s border restrictions and checkpoint closures were unjustified, politically motivated, and unrelated to alleged “weather balloon” incursions tied to cigarette smuggling.
The document — dated 9 December 2025 — portrays Lithuania’s response as hysteria, claims Lithuanian officials lack evidence of a “hybrid attack,” and suggests Lithuania is manufacturing escalation to extract EU funding and justify domestic policy decisions.
But when Belarus’s narrative is placed next to Lithuania’s public statements, EU positions, and a separate Ukrainian border-guard incident involving a contraband balloon, several of Belarus’s most pointed insinuations become difficult to sustain.
What Belarus claims in its UN annex
Belarus asserts that:
Lithuania’s closure of checkpoints has “no logical connection” to balloon incidents.
Lithuanian prosecutors and border services allegedly avoid describing the balloon activity as “organized” or as a “hybrid attack,” implying there is no evidence.
Lithuanian politicians are exaggerating balloon numbers and inflating the threat for political and financial benefit.
The smuggling operation is driven by EU-based criminals (not Belarus) and is linked to Lithuanian SIM cards found in trackers.
Belarus also cites a specific dispute over scale: it says Lithuanian officials floated figures “from several dozen to 200” balloons on 22 October 2025, while Belarus claims Lithuania detected only 12 that day.
What Lithuania actually said publicly — and why it matters
Lithuania’s public position in late October and through December 2025 was not “this is routine smuggling.” It repeatedly treated the balloon activity as a national security issue — including explicit language of escalation and hybrid pressure.
On 22 October 2025, Reuters reported Lithuania resumed flights at Vilnius Airport and reopened crossings after closures triggered by balloons entering the capital’s airspace. Lithuania’s Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė warned that if such incidents repeated, Lithuania would close the border again, saying: “We will make no concessions to Belarus.” Reuters also reported “dozens” of balloons drifted toward the airport area and that about a dozen were found on the ground, with four arrests tied to retrieval.
By 29 October 2025, Lithuania extended restrictions, keeping border crossings closed to most travellers until 30 November, and framed the balloon incidents as part of a broader hostile pattern. Reuters quoted the EU’s official position that these balloons were occurring in a “broader targeted hybrid campaign” (linked as well to state-sponsored migrant pressure), and reported Lithuania had shut airports five times that month due to the balloon threat.
Then in December 2025, Lithuania escalated further: it declared a state of emergency over the balloon incursions, again describing them as a “hybrid attack” and seeking expanded authority and military support to respond.
Bottom line: Belarus’s annex tries to portray Lithuania’s “hybrid” framing as speculative — but Lithuania and EU institutions repeatedly used precisely that framing in public, on the record.
The “no evidence of organization” claim runs into a wall: Lithuania’s arrests
Belarus’s annex leans heavily on the idea that Lithuanian prosecutors avoid describing the balloon activity as organized — implying a lack of proof.
Yet in mid-December, Lithuanian authorities announced a major enforcement operation: 21 arrests in what was described as a structured smuggling network using weather balloons, with extensive seizures (including tracking and communications equipment).
That matters because it directly undermines the annex’s insinuation that Lithuanian law enforcement cannot substantiate organization. Even if one debates who ultimately enables the activity, Lithuania’s public enforcement record does not match Belarus’s “there’s nothing there” posture.
Ukraine enters the picture — not as a talking point, but as an incident report
Belarus’s annex tries to reframe the balloon issue as a purely Lithuanian political performance.
But Ukraine independently reported a balloon-linked contraband find near its border — with details that look structurally similar to the Baltic cases (cigarettes + GPS trackers + SIM cards).
On 16 December 2025, Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service reported border guards in Volyn Oblast found a package of 1,500 packs of Belarus-excise cigarettes, wrapped and attached to remnants of a balloon, along with two GPS devices: one with a Belarusian SIM card and another with a Polish operator SIM. Ukrainian border guards assessed the balloon was likely heading toward Poland.
Ukraine’s report doesn’t “prove” Belarusian state direction — but it does weaken Belarus’s attempt to treat the balloon phenomenon as purely rhetorical or uniquely Lithuanian.
The numbers dispute: “200 balloons” vs “12 detected” may be apples vs oranges
Belarus’s annex highlights an alleged Lithuanian claim of “several dozen to 200” balloons on 22 October 2025, then says Lithuania detected only 12.
What we can verify from contemporaneous reporting is this:
Reuters described “dozens” drifting toward the airport area that night, and separately noted “about a dozen” were found on the ground.
Other reporting and EU institutions later referenced radar detections and repeated disruptions over weeks — which can inflate counts depending on whether you mean radar contacts, objects tracked, balloons recovered, or contraband packages retrieved.
So Belarus may be exploiting ambiguity in measurement: recovered balloons ≠ radar detections ≠ reported sightings. But Lithuania’s policy response was anchored less in one day’s count and more in repeated aviation disruption + border/security escalation.
The real unresolved question Belarus avoids
Belarus’s annex spends a lot of energy trying to prove Lithuania is hypocritical, bureaucratic, or financially motivated.
It spends far less time answering the core issue:
If balloons carrying contraband are repeatedly launched from or near Belarus and drift into EU airspace, what concrete enforcement actions inside Belarus are being taken to stop launches at source — especially if Belarus simultaneously claims it is “forced to fight smuggling on its own”?
Notably, in mid-December Reuters reported a U.S. envoy said Belarus had agreed to take measures to stop balloon flyovers into Lithuania — which suggests the issue is not merely “Lithuanian imagination,” even if responsibility remains disputed.